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THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NCAA'S
"PREGNANCY EXCEPTION" - DOES THE NCAA
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST MALE STUDENT-ATHLETES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") pun-
ished University of Kansas football player Eric Butler for doing "the
right thing."1 Butler took a year off from playing football to help
raise his newborn daughter.2 Now, the NCAA refuses to grant But-
ler the same rights that it would have offered a female student-ath-
lete.3 Under present NCAA rules, a female student-athlete may
obtain a pregnancy exception in order to extend her period of ath-
letic eligibility from five years to six years.4 The NCAA, however,
does not provide an equivalent or similar exception for male stu-
dent-athletes. 5
1. See Chris Wristen, The Bias of the NCAA, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.ryze.
com/posttopic.php?topicid=732490&confid=1031 (on file with author) (praising
Butler's decision to take year off from playing football as "not only the right thing
to do. It was the responsible, mature and honorable thing to do.").
2. See Debbie Schlussel, Title IX According to the Dixie Chicks, Aug. 23, 2006,
http://www.debbieschlussel.com/archives/2006/08/title-ix-accord.html (com-
menting that Butler's involvement in his baby's life was "admirable").
3. See id. (arguing that National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")
does not promote equality because "sexist policies" like pregnancy exception not
only discriminate against male student-athletes but do not encourage male stu-
dent-athletes to become involved in their children's lives). The NCAA's decision
sends the message that it is more important for female student-athletes than male
student-athletes to take time off from collegiate athletics to raise a child. See id.
"[R] egardless of the social implications, [the exception is] flat out discriminatory."
Id. The NCAA should use Butler as a role model to encourage future male stu-
dent-athletes to become more involved in the lives of their children. See Wristen,
supra note 1 (suggesting that NCAA made wrong decision when it did not grant
Butler pregnancy exception).
4. See 2006-2007 NCAA DIVISION I MANuAL, art. 14.2.1 (July 2006), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/divisionji_manual/2006-07/2006-07-
dlmanual.pdf ("Five-Year Rule. A student-athlete shall complete his or her sea-
sons of participation within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester
or quarter in which the student-athlete first registered for a minimum full-time
program of studies in a collegiate institution . . . ."). "Pregnancy Exception. A
member institution may approve a one-year extension of the five-year period of
eligibility for a female student-athlete for reasons of pregnancy." Id. at art.
14.2.1.3.
5. See Kelly Whiteside, NCAA Denies Appeal by Kansas Athlete, USA TODAY, Aug.
15, 2006, at 9C [hereinafter NCAA Denies Appeal] (noting NCAA's refusal to grant
Butler sixth year of eligibility). NCAA spokesman Erik Christianson said, "'[t]he
pregnancy exception is explicitly written for female students whose physical condi-
(327)
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Butler's story begins with both him and his girlfriend planning
to attend Northwest Missouri State University, about two hours
north of their hometown of Leawood, Kansas. 6 In February of
2001, however, when the couple learned they were expecting a
baby, Butler decided to attend DeVry University in Kansas City,
near their hometown. 7 Thus, Butler's five-year period of eligibility
began in the fall of 2001 when he enrolled and started taking clas-
ses at DeVry University.8
In 2005, after transferring schools, Butler earned a spot on the
University of Kansas ("KU") football team.9 The KU football pro-
gram, a Division I-A program in the Big XII conference, offered
Butler a chance to be scouted by National Football League
recruiters.' 0 However, by the fall of 2006, Butler's five-year period
of athletic eligibility had expired. 1 Three times KU petitioned the
NCAA for a waiver of the five-year requirement, but the NCAA de-
nied the petition on all three occasions. 12 OnJuly 31, 2006, Butler
tion due to pregnancy prevents their participation in intercollegiate athletics and
therefore is not applicable in this case' .... Id.
6. See Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 06-2319 KHV, 2006 WL
2398683, at *2 (D. Kan. 2006) (noting that Butler anticipated playing football at
Northwest Missouri State); see also Kelly Whiteside, Suit Tests Ban on Leave for Father-
Athletes, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2006, at 10C [hereinafter Suit Tests Ban] (stating that
Butler and his girlfriend attended high school in Leawood, Kansas).
7. See Suit Tests Ban, supra note 6 (explaining that couple did not attend
Northwest Missouri State because it prohibited infants from living in its dormito-
ries). Northwest Missouri State University describes itself as a four-year fully-ac-
credited university. See Northwest Missouri State University Profile, http://www.
nwmissouri.edu/aboutus/profile.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (detailing various
facts about Northwest Missouri State University). Conversely, DeVry University of-
fers degrees at more than eighty physical locations or online. See DeVry University,
http://www.devry.edu/home.jsp (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (providing general in-
formation about school). Most of the degrees offered by DeVry are traditionally in
the areas of computer engineering and technology. See DeVry University Accredi-
tation, http://www.devry.edu/whydevry/accreditation.jsp (last visited Mar. 30,
2007) (listing accredited programs offered by school).
8. See 2006-2007 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1.1 (not-
ing start of five-year period of eligibility occurs when student-athlete registers for
full-time program and attends first day of class); see also Suit Tests Ban, supra note 6
(pointing out that DeVry University does not have collegiate sports).
9. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *2 (stating that Butler transferred from
DeVry University to Avila University to University of Kansas ("KU")). For a further
discussion of Bulter's time at Avila University, see infra note 27 and accompanying
text.
10. See id. at *4 (highlighting Butler's argument that if temporary restraining
order is not granted, he cannot play football and thus will lose additional season to
be scouted by National Football League).
11. See id. at *2 (noting that Butler's five-year period of athletic eligibility ex-
pired in July 2006).
12. See id. (specifying KU first requested waiver from NCAA in January 2006,
which NCAA denied in April 2006; KU asked NCAA to reconsider request in May
2
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filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas claim-
ing that the NCAA and KU violated his rights under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX").1 3 Butler requested a
preliminary injunction against the NCAA to allow him to play on
KU's football team during the 2006 season, but the court denied his
request.' 4
This Comment examines the viability of Butler's claim given
the present environment of Title IX interpretation. 1 5 First, this
Comment begins by detailing the facts of Butler's case. 16 Second,
this Comment provides a comprehensive look at Title IX by exam-
ining the historical development of the statute, a male student-ath-
lete's rights under the statute, and a pregnant female student-
athlete's rights under the statute. 1 7 Third, this Comment discusses
the use of precedent established under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII") to interpret Title IX.18 In particular, this
Comment explores a male employee's rights under Title VII as well
as an employee's maternity and paternity rights under Title VII. 19
Fourth, this Comment analyzes whether the NCAA is subject to the
requirements of Title IX.2° Finally, this Comment explores the rel-
evant legal arguments available to both Butler and the NCAA. 21
2006, but NCAA denied request for reconsideration in June 2006; finally, KU ap-
pealed NCAA's denial in August 2006, but NCAA denied appeal in August 2006).
13. See id. at *1 (referring to filing information of Butler's suit).
14. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *1 (motioning for temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction which would allow But-
ler to continue playing football while court decides case). The U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas denied Butler's motion because it found that he did not
have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits. See id. at *3. For a fur-
ther discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the legal issues surrounding Butler's claim
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), see infra notes
123-98 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the facts of Butler's case, see infra notes 22-39
and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of Title IX, see infra notes 40-73 and accompany-
ing text.
18. For a further discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights of Act 1964 ("Title
VII") as it relates to Title IX, see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of an employee's rights under Title VII, see infra
notes 80-110 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the NCAA's amenability to suit under Title IX,
see infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the legal analysis of Butler's claim, see infra
notes 123-98 and accompanying text.
2007] 329
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts of Butler's Case
In the process of achieving his goal of playing collegiate foot-
ball, Butler remained dedicated to his girlfriend and their baby. 22
In 2001, when Butler learned that his girlfriend was pregnant, he
did not shirk his parental responsibilities. 23 Instead, he made per-
sonal sacrifices to devote time to his girlfriend and their newborn
baby.24 Butler originally planned to attend Northwest Missouri
State in Maryville, Missouri to play football. 25 Upon hearing that he
was going to be a father, however, Butler transferred to DeVry Uni-
versity in Kansas City, Missouri, thus giving up his chance to play
football during his first year of college. 26
In the spring of 2003, Butler enrolled at Avila University in
Kansas City and played collegiate football for the first time during
the 2003-2004 season. 27 Butler transferred to KU in the fall of
2004.28 He tried out for KU's football team as a "walk-on" and, in
the fall of 2005, Butler played as an alternate starter on the defen-
22. See Wristen, supra note 1 (commenting on how Butler did "the right
thing" and made personal sacrifices by attending different school and not playing
football to be part of his girlfriend and their baby's lives).
23. See Schlussel, supra note 2 (noting Butler did not leave his girlfriend and
their baby as many other fathers do).
24. See Wristen, supra note 1 (suggesting that others should look up to Butler
as role model because he took year off from playing football to help his girlfriend
and their newborn baby).
25. See Suit Tests Ban, supra note 6 (stating that both Butler and his girlfriend,
Chantel Frazier, were from Leawood, Kansas and planned to attend Northwest Mis-
souri State, approximately two hours away from Leawood).
26. See id. (commenting that even though Butler could not play football be-
cause DeVry University does not have collegiate sports, Butler's enrollment at
DeVry University nonetheless began his five-year period of athletic eligibility).
27. See Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 06-2319 KHV, 2006 WL
2398683, at *2 (D. Kan. 2006) (noting that, after attending DeVry University in
2001, Butler did not attend college in fall semester of 2002). In the spring semes-
ter of 2003, Butler earned nine credits at Avila University. See id. Butler continued
taking classes at Avila University during the fall semester of 2003 and the spring
semester of 2004. See id. Also, on March 6, 2004, Butler and his girlfriend, Chantel
Frazier, married. See id.
28. See id. (pointing out that Butler withdrew from his classes at KU during
fall semester of 2004, but re-enrolled at KU in spring semester of 2005 and earned
twelve credits).
[Vol. 14: p. 327
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sive line.29 During the 2005 football season, Butler played in all
twelve of KU's games and recorded thirteen tackles.30
When KU realized that Butler's five-year period of eligibility
would end in July 2006, KU requested a waiver from the NCAA in
accordance with NCAA bylaws.3 ' In April 2006, the NCAA denied
KU's waiver request.3 2 KU asked the NCAA to reconsider its re-
quest; again, the NCAA denied the waiver request.3 3 On August 3,
2006, KU exercised its last option under NCAA bylaws and ap-
pealed the NCAA's decision; seven days later the NCAA denied the
appeal. 34
29. See id. (describing Butler's position on KU football team). The NCAA
defines a "walk-on" as a student-athlete who plays in a varsity sport without having
received a scholarship. See Debra E. Blum, An Intense Debate over "Walk-Ons",
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 14, 1993, available at http://www.ncaa.org/gender-
equity/resource materials/AdditionalMaterials/IntenseDebateOverWalkOns_93.
pdf (recognizing that most "walk-ons" are not recruited to play on collegiate ath-
letic teams).
30. See Ryan Wood, Butler's Eligibility Saga Continues, LAWRENCE-J. WORLD, Aug.
13, 2006, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2006/aug/03/butlers-eligibility-saga-
continues/?sports (on file with author) (noting that KU offered Butler athletic
scholarship to return to football team for 2006 season).
31. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *2 (requesting waiver of five-year eligibility
rule under article 30.6.1 of NCAA bylaws); see also 2006-2007 NCAA DMISION I
MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1.5 ("Additional Waivers. The Committee on
Student-Athlete Reinstatement, by a two-thirds majority of its members present
and voting, may approve such additional waivers to the five-year rule as it deems
appropriate. (See Bylaw 30.6.1 for criteria.)"). Under NCAA Administrative By-
laws, art. 30.6.1, a waiver may be granted if a student-athlete is deprived of partici-
pating in his or her sport for more than one season "for reasons that are beyond
the control of the student-athlete or the institution ...... Id. at art. 30.6.1. If
circumstances deprive a student-athlete from participating in his or her sport for
only one season, the Committee may still consider the request in "circumstances of
extraordinary or extreme hardship." Id. The bylaws then list specific circum-
stances that are considered beyond the control of the student-athlete and specific
circumstances that are considered within the control of the student-athlete. See id.
at art. 30.6.1.1. (listing examples of circumstances beyond control of student-ath-
lete for which NCAA would consider granting waiver such as "a life-threatening or
incapacitating injury or illness suffered by a member of the student-athlete's imme-
diate family").
32. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *2 (specifying that NCAA notified KU of
denial on April 12, 2006).
33. See id. (emphasizing that on May 11, 2006 KU requested reconsideration
and on June 14, 2006 NCAA denied KU's request for reconsideration).
34. See id. (stating that after NCAA notified KU of its denial of KU's appeal on
August 11, 2006, Butler was no longer able to practice with team); see also 2006-
2007 NCAA DIVISION I MANuAL, supra note 4, at art. 30.6.1 (detailing that if stu-
dent-athlete's five years of eligibility have ended, he or she may continue to prac-
tice, but not compete, with his or her team for thirty days provided his or her
institution has requested waiver, but if NCAA denies wavier before 30-day period
ends, student-athlete must stop practicing immediately).
2007]
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While KU petitioned the NCAA, Butler filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas on July 31, 2006.35 Butler
claimed that the NCAA and KU violated his rights under Tide IX
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36
He moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin KU from
enforcing the NCAA's decision to deny him a sixth year of athletic
eligibility. 37 In addition, Butler requested a preliminary injunction
to allow him to continue to practice with the team in preparation
for the 2006 football season.38 On August 15, 2006, the district
court denied Butler's motion and declined to issue him any tempo-
rary relief.39
B. Discussion of Title IX
1. History of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
35. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *1 (noting date that Butler filed suit).
36. See id. at *3 (pointing out that Title IX, codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688,
prohibits discrimination based on sex). This Comment will only focus on Butler's
Title IX claim against the NCAA. For a further discussion of Butler's Title IX
claim against the NCAA, see infra notes 124-97 and accompanying text.
37. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *1 (highlighting Butler's argument that
although KU is member institution of NCAA, KU is liable for choosing to enforce
NCAA rules).
38. See id. (recognizing that Butler also motioned for permanent injunction);
see also University of Kansas, 2006 Football Schedule, http://kuathletics.cstv.com/
sports/m-footbl/archive/kan-m-footbl-sched-2006.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007)
(stressing urgency of Butler's request to continue to practice with team in order to
prepare for KU's first football game of 2006 season slated for September 2, 2006).
39. See Butler, 2006 WL 2398683, at *4 (holding that Butler did not meet re-
quirements for obtaining temporary restraining order ("TRO") or preliminary in-
junction). To obtain a TRO, the plaintiff must prove "(1) that he has a substantial
likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury
unless the [TRO] issues; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs whatever dam-
age the proposed [TRO] may cause defendants; and (4) that the [TRO], if issued,
will not be adverse to the public interest." Id. at *2 (citing Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th
Cir. 1986)). The court found that Butler did not establish a substantial likelihood
of success on his Title IX claim because the NCAA may be able to allow the preg-
nancy exception in article 14.2.1.3 "'for reasons of pregnancy,' which appear to be
different from reasons of maternity or paternity." Id. at *3 (relying on Johnson v.
Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 2005)). Concerning Butler's Equal Pro-
tection claim, the court found that the NCAA's policy of granting pregnancy ex-
ceptions to female athletes appeared to be "substantially related to the
achievement of 'important government objectives"' and, therefore, Butler could
not establish a substantial likelihood of success. Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982)) (establishing standard party must meet to
uphold classification based on gender). Moreover, the court held that Butler will
not suffer irreparable injury, that the harm to defendants outweighs the harm to
Butler, and that the public interest weighs in favor of defendants. See id. at *34.
[Vol. 14: p. 327
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subjected to discrimination under any education program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance .... "40 Title IX requires
educational institutions that receive federal funding to provide
men and women with equal opportunities.41 Thus, Title IX applies
to almost every college and university across the country. 42 Four
years after the Title IX's passage, the number of women playing
collegiate sports increased 600%, totaling over two million by
1976.4
3
Meanwhile, as more women began to play collegiate sports,
schools remained unsure as to whether the additional athletic op-
portunities provided to female student-athletes were sufficient to
render the school Title IX-compliant.44 In short, schools did not
have adequate Congressional guidance to implement the broad re-
quirements of Title IX. 4 5 Presently, three main sources of guidance
exist to assist schools in becoming Title IX-compliant: (1) regula-
tions issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW"), (2) a policy interpretation establishing a three-part effec-
tive accommodation test by HEW's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"),
40. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(2000).
41. See Stephen F. Ross et al., Remark, Rededication Panel Discussion on Gender
Equity and Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 133 (1995) (noting that
Title IX requires school "to provide equal educational opportunities for [both]
students and employees"). In 1987, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration
Act ("CRRA"), requiring an entire school to be Title IX-compliant if any part of
the school received federal funding. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-259, § 908, 102 Stat. 28, sec. 3(a) (1988) (expanding definition of "pro-
gram or activity" in 20 U.S.C. § 1681 of Title IX, as defined under § 20 U.S.C. 1687,
to include "all of the operations of... a college, university or other postsecondary
institution ... any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance .... ").
Congress intended the CRRA to counter the Supreme Court's ruling in Grove City
College v. Bell. See 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984) (holding that if specific department
within educational institution indirectly received federal funding, it "does not trig-
ger institutionwide coverage under Title IX"). The Court's interpretation of Title
IX in Grove City severely limited the impact of Title IX because most athletic de-
partments did not receive federal funding directly and, therefore, were not subject
to Title IX's requirements. See Megan K. Starace, Comment, Reverse Discrimination
Under Title IX: Do Men Have a Sporting Chance?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189, 196
(2001) (discussing effects of Title IX on non-revenue men's athletic teams). CRRA
restored Title IX to Congress's original intent, mandating that Title IX be applied
to all parts of an educational institution such that if any part received federal fund-
ing, then the entire institution was subject to Title IX. See id.
42. See Ross, supra note 41, at 133 (remarking on broad impact of Title IX).
43. See Starace, supra note 41, at 189 (citing huge increase in number of fe-
male athletes as result of passage of Title IX).
44. See id. at 192 (describing initial uncertainty as to how colleges and univer-
sities should apply Title IX as result of lack of secondary legislative materials).
45. See id. at 192 n.28 (noting absence of Congressional committee report
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and (3) the Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual ("Manual") is-
sued by the Department of Education's OCR.46
First, in 1975, HEW issued a set of comprehensive regulations
to interpret Title IX.4 7 The regulations determine Title IX-compli-
ance by focusing on whether male and female student-athletes re-
ceive equal opportunities to play sports, not on the amount of
money spent by the school. 48 In determining if a school provides
equal opportunities to its male and female students, the regulations
provide a wide variety of factors for the HEW director to consider -
from the quality of the equipment, to the availability of academic
tutoring, to guidelines regarding publicity. 49
Second, in response to the continuing confusion regarding Ti-
dle IX's requirements, HEW's OCR released a policy interpretation
in 1979.50 The interpretation includes a three-part effective accom-
46. See Ross, supra note 41, at 13940 (mentioning that, in addition to regula-
tions, policy interpretation, and Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual ("Man-
ual"), statute itself and precedent are also helpful in establishing standards for
compliance under Title IX). Currently, the Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights ("OCR") oversees Title IX's enforcement after Congress divided the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") into the Department of
Education and the Department of Health and Human Services in 1979. See Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing confusing nature of
regulatory framework surrounding Title IX); see also Starace, supra note 41, at 197
(pointing out that regulations, policy interpretation, and Manual, together with
CRRA, have clarified what is required of schools to become Title IX-compliant).
For a further discussion of the CRRA, see supra note 41.
47. See Starace, supra note 41, at 192 (explaining that Congress instructed
HEW to issue regulations in order to clarify requirements of Title IX).
48. See id. at 193 (stating that HEW was concerned with "compliance through
equal opportunity instead of compliance through equal expenditure").
49. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2006) (defining HEW's use of term equal op-
portunity). To evaluate whether a school complies with Title IX, the HEW direc-
tor should consider the following factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Id.
50. See Policy Interpretation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
86) (commenting that policy interpretation is specifically designed to guide imple-
mentation of Title IX in intercollegiate athletics).
[Vol. 14: p. 327
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modation test.5 1 Courts rely heavily on this test to construe Title
IX.52 Under part one of the test, participation opportunities for
male and female students that are "substantially proportionate" to
the gender composition of the entire student body render a school
Title IX-compliant.53 Alternatively, under part two of the test, a
school is Title IX-compliant if it "can show a history and continuing
practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to
the developing interest and abilities of the [underrepresented]
sex."54 Finally, under part three of the test, a school meets the re-
quirements of Title IX if "the interests and abilities of [the under-
represented] sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by
the present program. '55
51. See Starace, supra note 41, at 194 (noting that effective accommodation
test only requires one of three parts to be met for school to be considered Title IX-
compliant).
52. See id. at 194 n.44 (stressing use of effective accommodation test in appel-
late court decisions).
53. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (stating that if school
meets this requirement, second and third benchmarks need not be considered);
see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1993) (offering that if
school does not want to undergo "extensive compliance analysis," it may "stay on
the sunny side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student
body and its athletic lineup"). A school may obtain "substantially proportionate"
participation opportunities between the sexes by adding or upgrading teams of the
underrepresented sex or, subtracting or downgrading teams of the over-
represented sex. See id. at 898 n.15.
54. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (listing alternative way for
school to comply with Title IX if it does not meet first benchmark); see also Cohen,
991 F.2d at 898 (mentioning that second benchmark allows school to be Title IX-
complaint without having to "leap to complete gender parity in a single bound").
A school meets the second requirement if it can prove an "ongoing effort" to in-
crease participation opportunities for the underrepresented sex. See id.
55. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (providing final way for
school to become Title IX-compliant if it has not met part one or part two of
effective accommodation test); see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (noting that most
schools attempt to meet requirements of Title IX by satisfying third benchmark).
Typically, a university does not meet the first part of the effective accommodation
test because the participation opportunities between the sexes rarely reflect the
gender composition of the university's student body. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898.
Most universities have limited financial resources and, therefore, do not to meet
the second part of the effective accommodation test because it requires expansion
of the athletic programs of the underrepresented sex. See id. Whereas, if "one sex
is demonstrably less interested in athletics," then the third part of the effective
accommodation test does not require a university to spend money increasing ath-
letic opportunities for that sex because their interest and abilities are already being
met by the present program. See id. The third benchmark is strict in that it re-
quires "full and effective" accommodation; however, a school does not necessarily
fail if some members of the underrepresented sex are interested in a sport that the
school does not offer. See id. Once there is "'sufficient interest and ability among
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a reasonable expec-
tation of intercollegiate competition for that team,'" then a school must provide
9
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Third, the Athletics Investigator's Manual ("Manual") is per-
haps the most practical guide to Title IX.56 Published by the OCR
in 1990, OCR personnel use the Manual as an audit guide to deter-
mine if schools are Title IX-compliant. 57 The Manual includes thir-
teen "general areas of compliance," as well as examples of how
schools can satisfy one of the three prongs of HEW's "effective ac-
commodation" test.58 The 1975 regulations, the 1979 policy inter-
pretation, and the 1990 Manual, together, clarify Title IX's
requirements. 59
2. A Male Athlete's Rights Under Title IX
During the 1990s, many schools faced budget constraints and,
in an effort to reduce their operating expenses, eliminated athletic
programs. 60 Consequently, many student-athletes filed suit against
their respective schools, claiming that their schools violated Title IX
by eliminating their sports instead of sports played by the opposite
sex.61 Male athletes filed numerous lawsuits claiming that their
an opportunity for the underrepresented sex to participate in that sport. Id. (quot-
ing 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418).
56. See Starace, supra note 41, at 196-97 (suggesting that because Manual is so
detailed, it has "considerable practical significance"). But see Ross, supra note 41, at
140 (noting it is unclear whether courts will use Manual in their legal analysis).
57. See VALERIE M. BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGA-
TOR'S MANUAL Introduction (1990), available at http://www.ncaa.org/gender-eq-
uity/resource-materials/AuditMaterial/Investigator'sManual.pdf (describing
Manual as aiding OCR personnel in handling complaints, scheduling compliance
reviews, or issuing letters of finding).
58. See id. at 1 (listing thirteen areas included in 1975 regulations and 1979
policy interpretation). For a further discussion of the ten areas in the 1975 regula-
tions, see supra note 49 and accompanying text. The remaining three areas of
compliance are (1) athletic scholarships, (2) support services, and (3) recruitment
of student athletes. See BONNETTE & DANIEL, supra note 57, at 1. The Manual spec-
ifies the particular data that should be collected for HEW's effective accommoda-
tion test and suggests questions to ask of administrators, coaches, and athletes. See
id. at 22-24. Further, the Manual addresses the difficulty of the effective accommo-
dation test's third benchmark, stating, "[i]f the institution has not conducted a
survey or used another method for determining interests and abilities . . . then
OCR must determine to what degree the current program accommodates interests
and abilities [of the underrepresented sex]." Id. at 25. Specifically, the Manual
instructs OCR personnel to review the "'expressed interest"' of the under-
represented sex by observing the number of participants on club and intramural
teams, sports programs at "'feeder"' schools, and physical education classes. See id.
59. See Starace, supra note 41, at 197 (commenting that three sources of gui-
dance, along with CRRA, "have all helped to create a better understanding of Title
IX").
60. See Charles P. Beveridge, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When
Schools Cut Men's Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 809, 810 n.6 (1996) (noting
instances in which universities cut athletic teams due to budget constraints).
61. See id. (enumerating following lawsuits as resulting from budget con-
straints: Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128
10
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schools violated Title IX; thus far, none of the suits have been
successful.62
For example, in Kelley, members of the University of Illinois's
men's swimming team sued the school claiming that the elimina-
tion of the men's swimming program violated Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the school
did not violate Tide IX because "men's participation in athletics
would continue to be more than substantially proportionate to
their presence in the University's student body."64 Therefore, the
University of Illinois's decision proved instead to be "extremely pru-
dent" because it ensured compliance with Title IX under the first
benchmark of HEW's 1979 policy interpretation. 65
(1995); Favia v. Ind. Univ., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995)); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)
(ruling that Title IX provides for private right of action similar to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76
(1992) (holding that private individual may bring action for damages against
school under Title IX).
62. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272 (finding that termination of men's swimming
program did not violate Title IX); see also Miami U. Wrestling Club v. Miami U.,
302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2002) (denying plaintiffs claim that Miami University's
elimination of men's wrestling, men's soccer, and men's tennis violated Title IX);
Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasiz-
ing that school may comply with Title IX by "leveling down programs instead of
ratcheting them up" as California State University, Bakersfield did when it elimi-
nated men's wrestling team); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 639 (7th
Cir. 1999) (reasoning that Illinois State University's termination of men's soccer
and men's wrestling did not violate Title IX because basis for decision was to en-
sure that athletic participation opportunities between sexes remained substantially
proportionate to student body in accordance with Title IX); Chalenor v. Univ. of
N.D., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (D. N.D. 2000) (explaining that because "men
are still substantially overrepresented within the university's athletic programs,"
school's decision to eliminate men's wrestling was proper under Title IX); Gonyo,
879 F. Supp. at 1004 (stating that school's decision to terminate men's wrestling
program did not violate Title IX). "The statute focuses on opportunities for the
underrepresented gender, and does not bestow rights on the historically over-
represented gender .. " Miami U. Wrestling Club, 302 F.3d at 614 (citing Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 174 (1st Cir. 1996) and Neal, 198 F.3d at 770)).
63. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267 (indicating that plaintiffs sought injunction
prohibiting termination of team and damages against Board of Trustees of Univer-
sity of Illinois, chancellor, athletic director, and associate athletic director).
64. Id. at 270. The court recognized that the university's decision to eliminate
the men's swimming program was based on considerations that program was "his-
torically weak," not "widely offered" in high schools, and did not "have a large
spectator following." Id. at 269.
65. See id. at 269 (noting that university's decision to retain women's swim-
ming program and eliminate men's swimming program promoted compliance
with Title IX). Moreover, if the university had also decided to terminate the wo-
men's swimming program, it may have been "vulnerable to a finding that it was in
11
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3. Pregnancy Under Title IX
Title IX regulations prohibit any school qualifying as a recipi-
ent under Title IX from discriminating against a student on the
basis of pregnancy. 66 Title IX regulations also require a school to
"treat pregnancy.., and recovery therefrom in the same manner
and under the same policies as any other temporary disability with
respect to any medical or hospital benefit, service, plan or policy
.... 67 Any benefit that a school offers to a temporarily disabled
student, therefore, must also be offered to a pregnant student.68 If
a school does not have a temporary disability leave policy, or if a
pregnant student fails to qualify for leave under her school's policy,
then Title IX regulations require a school to treat pregnancy "as a
justification for a leave of absence for so long a period of time as is
deemed medically necessary by the student's physician . . . "69
In Chipman v. Grant County School District, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled that a high school
may have violated Title IX when it excluded two female students
who had given birth out of wedlock from joining the National
Honor Society ("NHS"). 7° The high school invited every student
with a grade point average of at least 3.5 to join the NHS, except
the two female plaintiffs. 71 Based on the similarity between Title
VII and Title IX, the court applied Title VII precedent to interpret
Title IX's prohibition against pregnancy discrimination. 72 The
violation of Title IX" because the percentage of female student-athletes is "substan-
tially lower" than the percentage of female students. Id.
66. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (1) ("A recipient shall not discriminate against
any student, or exclude any student from ... any class or extracurricular activity,
on the basis of such student's pregnancy . or recovery therefrom ... .
67. Id. at § 106.40(b) (4).
68. See Adina H. Rosenbaum, Note, Citizen-Soldier-Parent: An Analysis of Virginia
Military Institute's Parenting Policy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1262, 1270-71 (2003) (stressing
importance of comparing school's treatment of pregnant students with school's
treatment of other temporarily disabled students, not male students who have im-
pregnated female students, when determining if school violated Title IX
regulations).
69. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (5) (commenting that when student returns, she is
entitled to same status she held prior to taking leave of absence).
70. See 30 F. Supp. 2d 975, 978 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (ruling that plaintiffs had
strong probability of succeeding on merits of case since both students were other-
wise eligible tojoin National Honors Society ("NHS")). Both students were juniors
in high school and had grade point averages above 3.5. See id. at 977.
71. See id. (noting evidence that school considered fact that both students had
given birth out of wedlock when it did not extend invitation to students to join
NHS).
72. See id. at 978 (comparing similar purposes of Title VII and Title IX in
preventing discrimination against pregnancy). Courts have recognized that Title
VII permits use of a disparate impact theory to prove discrimination in pregnancy
12
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court held that the two female students met their burden of prov-
ing "'a significant adverse effect on a protected group"' because
the school did not invite them to join the NHS.73
C. Comparison to Employment Law
1. Courts' Use of Title VII Standards to Interpret Title IX Claims
Regarding Butler's claim, KU associate athletics director Jim
Marchiony declared, "[i]f this was in a workplace, this [would be]
an open-and-shut case [of gender discrimination] .-74 Title VII pro-
hibits discrimination in the workplace based on gender.75 Even
though Butler's lawsuit involves a Title IX claim, Title VII prece-
dent controls because U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that
Title IX claims should be interpreted using Title VII standards. 76
cases. See id. at 978 (citations omitted). The two female students have the burden
of proving that "'a particular... practice has caused a significant adverse effect on
a protected group.'" Id. at 979 (quoting U.S. v. City of Warren, Mich., 138 F.3d
1083, 1091 (6th Cir. 1998)). For a further discussion of Title VII generally, see
infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text, and for a further discussion of pregnancy
under Title VII, see infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
73. Chipman, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (quoting City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1091)
(holding that school's actions reflected dissimilar treatment between those stu-
dents who had visibly engaged in pre-marital sexual intercourse and those students
who had not).
74. NCAA Denies Appea supra note 5 (commenting on NCAA's refusal to
grant Butler pregnancy waiver because only females are eligible to receive preg-
nancy waiver).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1997) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer... to discriminate against any individual ... because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."). Title VII defines
.employer" as any person with "fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,"
excluding the United States government and "a bona fide private membership
club . . . ." Id. at § 2000e (b).
76. See Preston v. Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir.
1994) (recognizing that "most courts that have addressed the question have indi-
cated that Title VII principles should be applied to Title IX actions, at least insofar
as those actions raise employment discrimination claims"); see also Brine v. Univ. of
Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that court is "persuaded" by Preston,
Mabry, and Lipsett and will apply Title VII standards to Title IX); Lipsett v. Univ. of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying Title VII analysis to sexual harass-
ment claim under Title IX); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. and Occupational
Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that because Title IX and
Title VII both prohibit gender discrimination, it is "the most appropriate analogue
when defining Title IX's substantive standards"). But see Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 503
U.S. 60 (1992) (finding that Title VII should not be applied to Title IX because it
"would [not] result in the kind of orderly analysis so necessary in this confusing
area of the law," and further differentiating Title IX as "conditional grant" and
Title VII is "outright prohibition"). Further, the Supreme Court specifically de-
clined to address the argument of whether Title VII standards should be used to
interpret Title IX in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. See 503 U.S. 60, 65
2007] 339
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First, Title VII and Title IX both prohibit discrimination on the ba-
sis of gender.77 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended
Title IX to extend Title VII's prohibition against gender discrimina-
tion to educational institutions. 78 Finally, given the lack of Con-
gressional intent concerning Title IX and the presence of
substantial judicial precedent regarding Title VII, courts "see no
reason to establish different substantive standards for [gender] dis-
crimination under Title IX and Title VII. '79
2. A Male Employee's Rights Under Title VII
Although Congress passed Title VII to prevent employment
discrimination against female and African-American employees, Ti-
tle VII also protects Caucasian males against employment discrimi-
nation.8 0 A Caucasian male may bring a valid action under Title
VII if he can prove that his employer treated him differently
than a similarly situated female or minority.8 ' Further, he must
n.4 (1992) (noting that because plaintiff did not present argument before Su-
preme Court, Court "need not address" argument).
77. See Mabry, 813 F.2d at 316 n.6 (recognizing similarity of Title VII and Title
IX in that they prohibit "identical conduct").
78. See Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D. Md. 1994)
(commenting that Title VII "'specifically excludes educational institutions from its
terms"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-554 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2512)). The only difference between Title VII and Title IX is that Title IX effec-
tively extends Title VII's prohibition against discrimination to educational institu-
tions. See id.
79. Mabry, 813 F.2d. at 316 n.6 (applying Title VII standards in Title IX case);
see also Preston, 31 F.3d at 207 (finding that prior precedent established under Title
VII "provide [s] a persuasive body of standards to which we may look in shaping the
contours of a private right of action under Title IX").
80. See Kathryn Frueh Patterson, Comment, Discrimination in the Workplace: Are
Men and Women Not Entitled to the Same Parental Leave Benefits Under Title VII?, 47
SMU L. REV. 425, 426 (1994) (stating Congressional intent of Title VII); see also
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that
Title VII applied to Caucasian male employees); Loeffler v. Carlin, 780 F.2d 1365,
1370 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988)
(ruling that employer violated Title VII when it discharged Caucasian male
employee).
81. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 426 (noting situations in which Title VII
reverse discrimination claims are proper). See also generally 45C AM. JUR. 2D job
Discrimination § 2507 (2007) (recognizing that, when comparing employer's treat-
ment of plaintiff to employer's treatment of employee of different gender or race,
plaintiff must be similarly situated to other employee in all material respects).
"[T]he test is whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents,
would think [the incidents] roughly equivalent and the [two employees] similarly
situated ...." Id. The plaintiff and the other employee do not need to be exactly
alike; the two employees are similarly situated so long as they are "fair congeners."
See id. (citing Molloy v. Blanchard, 115 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1997)). "'In other
words, apples should be compared to apples."' Molloy, 115 F.3d at 91 (quoting
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (lst Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 14: p. 327
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prove that he was treated differently because of his gender or
race.
82
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, the Su-
preme Court held that two Caucasian male employees had a valid
claim of action under Title VII.83 An employer accused three em-
ployees of stealing; two of the employees were Caucasian and the
third was African-American.8 4 Six days later, the employer fired the
two Caucasian employees and retained the African-American em-
ployee.8 5 The two Caucasian employees filed suit against their em-
ployer claiming that the employer violated Title VII because the
employer treated similarly situated employees differently as a result
of their race.86 Relying on legislative history, prior precedent, and
interpretations of Tide VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), the Court held that Title VII applied
equally to Caucasian and African-American employees.8 7 The
Court noted Title VII prohibits "racial discrimination in private em-
ployment against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination
against nonwhites . *..."88
82. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 426-27 (listing second requirement of Title
VII discrimination suit); see also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282-83 (stating plaintiff's
claim that "the reason for the discrepancy in discipline was that the favored em-
ployee is Negro while [plaintiffs] are white."); Loeffler, 780 F.2d at 1370 (affirming
lower court's ruling that employer's retention of female employees and termina-
tion of male employee "was an act of discrimination [against male employee]
based on his sex").
83. See 427 U.S. at 283 ("While [defendant] may decide that participation in a
theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for employment, this criterion
must be 'applied, alike to members of all races,' and Title VII is violated if, as
[plaintiffs] alleged, it was not.").
84. See id. at 276 (detailing that three employees were accused of stealing sixty
one-gallon cans of antifreeze that were part of customer's shipment).
85. See id. (recognizing event that gave rise to employment discrimination
claim). The two Caucasian employees then filed complaints with their local union
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), both to no avail.
See id.
86. See id. at 282-83 n.1l (rejecting defense's argument that plaintiff did not
sufficiently prove similar degree of culpability between three employees in their
complaint). The court stressed that in order to proceed with a valid Title VII
claim, the plaintiff must only prove "that other 'employees involved in acts against
[the employer] of comparable seriousness ... were nevertheless retained .... .' Id.
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
87. See id. at 279 (citing precedent, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination against "'any [racial]
group, minority or majority'")). The Court also cited legislative history, stating "Ti-
tle VII was intended to 'cover white men and white women and all Americans'
.... Id. at 280 (quoting Rep. Celler, 110 CONG. REC. H2578 (1964)).
88. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279. (reasoning from interpretation of Title VII by
EEOC). The Court extended "great deference" to the EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII and noted that the EEOC "has consistently interpreted" Title VII as apply-
ing to Caucasians and African-Americans equally. See id. Moreover, the EEOC is
2007]
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A second case, Loeffler v. Carlin, established a male's right
under Title VII against employment discrimination based on gen-
der.8 9 The United States Postal Service ("USPS") fired the plaintiff,
a male postal employee, for violating a rule prohibiting the "casing"
of "boxholder" mail.90 The plaintiff claimed that his dismissal vio-
lated Title VII because USPS did not fire two similarly situated fe-
male employees found to have cased boxholder mail.91 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that the plaintiff had been treated differently than simi-
larly situated female employees; the court further agreed that he
had been treated differently because of his gender.92 The court
held that while USPS did have a right to terminate employees who
violated the rule, it must discipline employees who violated the rule
equally.93
the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII. See Susan Deller Ross, Legal
Aspects of Parental Leave: At the Crossroads, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SET-
TING A RESEARCH AND POLICy AGENDA 93, 94 (Janet Shibley Hyde and Marilyn J.
Essex eds., Temple Univ. Press 1991).
89. See 780 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that male's claim against
reverse discrimination based on gender was valid under Title VII).
90. See id. at 1368 (noting that after receiving three suspensions, United States
Postal Service ("USPS") terminated plaintiff when it caught him casing boxholder
mail for fourth time). Boxholder mail is third-class mail intended for the current
resident or occupant at a particular address; casing is the practice by which mail
carriers divide boxholder mail in their delivery case prior to leaving the post office,
as opposed to dividing boxholder mail as they deliver the mail. See id. at 1367.
91. See id. at 1368 (finding that rule against casing was continuously and
openly violated by plaintiff and two female employees). USPS caught one female
employee violating the rule three times, and she received a threat of dismissal;
USPS caught the other female employee "on numerous occasions," and she only
received a verbal warning. See id.
92. See id. at 1370 (denying employer's claim that district court had not prop-
erly decided that plaintiff had been treated differently because of his gender).
The employer claimed that the plaintiff was terminated because "he was the only
carrier caught frequently in the act ...." Id. at 1369. The number of times the
employer caught the plaintiff casing boxholder mail determined the punishment
of the plaintiff. See id. (noting defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for disparate treatment). The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. See id. Based "on its
assessment of the credibility of the [plaintiff's] witnesses," the district court held
that plaintiff met his burden of "'persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer' or 'showing [the court] that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Id. at 1369-70 (quoting Tate v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 723 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir. 1983)). In situations involving wit-
ness testimony, "appellate courts must give even greater deference to the trial
court's finding, 'for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor
and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief
in what is said."' Id. at 1370. (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 575 (1985)).
93. See id. at 1369 (holding that "some violators may not be protected merely
because of their gender").
[Vol. 14: p. 327
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3. Pregnancy Under Title VII
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA") which specifies that discrimination against a pregnant em-
ployee violates Title VII.94 The PDA classifies pregnancy as a disa-
bility, meaning that if an employer offers disability leave to male
employees and non-pregnant female employees, then the employer
must offer pregnant female employees disability leave as well. 95
Medical textbooks estimate that childbirth results in a six-week pe-
riod of physical disability. 96 Once her period of physical disability
94. See Title VII at § 2000e(k) (quoting Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"): "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but simi-
lar in their ability or inability to work .. "). Congress passed the PDA to counter
the United State Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. See 429
U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976); see also Deller Ross, supra note 88, at 95 (noting that after
Gilbert, rejecting EEOC's approach to pregnancy in workplace, Congress passed
PDA). The EEOC's approach mandated that employers grant pregnant employees
the same benefits as other employees. See Deller Ross, supra note 88, at 94. In
Gilbert, the Court held that an employer's policy which excluded disabilities arising
from pregnancy did not violate Title VII. See 429 U.S. at 145-46. The Court re-
jected the plaintiff's argument that the employer's exclusion of pregnancy from its
disability plan was "a simple pretext for discriminating against women," reasoning
that "[p]regnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is [also] significantly
different from the typical covered disease or disability." Id. at 136. Further, the
Court stated that " [pregnancy] is not a 'disease' at all, and is often a voluntarily
undertaken and desired condition ...." Id. The Court held that Title VII did not
require the employer's disability plan to cover the additional risk of pregnancy
unique to women. See id. at 139.
95. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 429 (explaining that if employers do not
offer disability leave, then, under PDA, pregnant female employees are not legally
required to be given leave). In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
the United States Supreme Court held that an employer must extend the same
pregnancy benefits that pregnant female employees receive to pregnant spouses of
male employees. See 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983). Just as an employer cannot legally
provide different levels of insurance coverage to spouses of male employees and
spouses of female employees, an employer cannot legally provide different levels
of pregnancy benefits to female employees and spouses of male employees. See id.
at 682-84 (stressing EEOC's consistent determination that it is unlawful for em-
ployer to provide different levels of insurance coverage for male and female em-
ployee spouses).
96. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 436 (noting that medical textbooks mea-
sure recovery from childbirth "on the healing of a woman's reproductive organs").
Approximately six weeks after childbirth, a woman's reproductive organs have
physically recovered, and she "is fully recovered from childbirth at that time." Id.
Most companies provide maternity leave for the birth of a child in two portions:
paid disability leave for a period of six weeks and unpaid childrearing leave for
varying lengths of time. See id. at 439. Paternity leave, the leave offered to male
employees when they become fathers, is equivalent to the length of time offered to
female employees as childrearing leave. See id. at 439. Based on the 2002 National
Survey of America's Families, eighty-nine percent of female employees have access
to maternity leave while seventy-one percent of male employees have access to pa-
ternity leave. See KATHERIN Ross PHILLIPS, URBAN INSTITUTE, GETTING TIME OFF:
2007] 343
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related to childbirth ends, the female employee is not entitled to
additional leave; moreover, her employer may not legally grant her
additional leave without offering similar leave to male employees. 97
Further, if an employer does not have a disability leave policy, an
employer may provide time off to pregnant female employees so
long as the time granted is based on a showing of "actual physical
disability" related to childbirth.98
In Johnson v. University of Iowa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the University of Iowa did not discriminate
against a male employee when it allowed his wife, also a University
employee, to take full-time disability leave for four weeks and part-
time leave for two weeks following the birth of their child, but de-
nied the same benefit to him.99 The court needed to decide if the
ACCESS TO LEAvE AMONG WORKING PARENTS, Apr. 22, 2004, available at http://www.
urban.org/publications/310977.html. Of those employees with access to leave,
forty-six percent of women and fifty-two percent of men have access to more than
three weeks of paid leave. See id.
97. See Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 903
F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that employer must offer male employees
leave for which employer offers female employees without showing of physical disa-
bility). In Schafer, the employer offered pregnant employees the choice of select-
ing childrearing leave or maternity leave, both for a period of up to one year. See
id. at 248. Under the policy, if a female employee chose childrearing leave, she
was not required to show a physical disability. See id. Because the employer did
not require a showing of physical disability, the court held that the employer must
also offer male employees the option to select childrearing leave for up to one
year. See id. The court differentiated childrearing leave and disability leave, noting
that the period of childrearing leave is more difficult to determine because "the
point at which childrearing leave actually begins and ends is not precise." Id. Be-
cause childrearing may begin for female employees at the time of childbirth, the
court ruled that male employees should also be entitled to childrearing leave at
the time of childbirth. See id. (realizing need for factual determination in each
case); see also Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987)
(noting California statute that provides pregnancy leave to female employees but
not to male employees is valid because it is narrowly written to include only period
of actual physical disability).
98. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285, 290 (finding that employer is not prohibited by
Title VII or PDA from providing more favorable treatment to pregnant female
employees than male employees or non-pregnant female employees provided that
favorable treatment does not extend to time period beyond physical disability re-
lated to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions).
99. See 431 F.3d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that father did not "estab-
lish [ ] the requisite adverse treatment of biological fathers" to succeed under Title
VII). When the father requested paid leave, similar to the mother's additional two
weeks of part-time paid leave, the university denied his request. See id. at 329. The
father, however, did receive unpaid leave from the university in accordance with
the Family Medical & Leave Act ("FMLA"). See id. at 331. Congress enacted the
FMLA in 1993 to provide employees with the option of taking up to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave for certain family and medical conditions, including the birth of a
child. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 102(a) (1) (A) (1993) (providing for leave because of son or daughter's birth).
The FMLA only applies to employers that have fifty or more employees. See id. at
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additional two weeks of part-time leave taken by the mother consti-
tuted disability leave or childrearing leave.100 Although the mother
obtained a medical release prior to beginning part-time work dur-
ing the additional two weeks, the court held that the university
could have granted the mother the additional two week part-time
leave based on her partial disability from childbirth.10 1 Moreover,
even if the father could prove that the additional two weeks consti-
tuted childrearing leave, the father did not have a valid Tide VII
claim because he could not prove that the university treated him
differently because of his gender. 10 2 To prove that the university
treated him differently based on his gender, the father would have
to compare the university's treatment of him to that of another sim-
ilarly situated female employee.103 The court held, however, that
the father and the mother were not similarly situated because the
father worked full-time and the mother worked part-time. 10 4 Fur-
ther, even if the two employees had been similarly situated in the
workplace, they would not have been similarly situated from a phys-
§ 101(4). Further, only employees that have worked at least one year and 1,250
hours are eligible to receive the FMLA's benefits. See id. at § 101(2).
100. See Johnson, 431 F.3d at 328 (recognizing that if employer grants chil-
drearing leave to mother so she can bond with newborn, there is "no legitimate
reason" why employer should not offer same leave to father). The father argued
that the additional two weeks were childrearing leave because the mother re-
quested the two weeks "'for the exclusive purpose of spending time with and car-
ing for [her] newborn child.'" Id. at 329 (quoting mother's affidavit). The court,
however, focused on the university's reasons for granting the additional two weeks,
not on the mother's reasons for requesting the two weeks. See id. The court held
that the two weeks constituted disability leave. See id. at 330.
101. See id. at 329-30 (detailing father's argument that if mother received
medical release, then she must no longer be disabled, and, therefore, any addi-
tional time off that she received must be considered childrearing leave). The
court rejected the father's argument based on his failure to "consider the possibil-
ity of partial disability leave." Id. at 330. The court reasoned that the issuance of a
medical release to the mother did not mean that she was "medically cleared to
return to work full-time without any restrictions ...." Id. The court noted that
during the additional two week part-time leave, the mother worked only ten hours
per week from home. See id.
102. See id. (holding that in order for father to be able to make valid Title VII
claim, he had to prove that university's stated reason for not allowing him paid
leave was pretext and that gender discrimination was real reason).
103. See id. (noting that "'test for determining whether employees are simi-
larly situated to a plaintiff is a rigorous one." (quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
417 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 2005))). The father must show that he is similarly
situated to a female employee "'in all relevant respects."' See id. (citing Rodgers, 417
F.3d at 853).
104. See id. (reasoning that mother and father were also not similarly situated
because "[t] hey had different job responsibilities, worked in different departments
and reported to different supervisors").
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ical perspective because the mother "had recently gone through
the physical trauma of labor."'10 5
Alternatively, the father argued that the University of Iowa dis-
criminated against him because its parental leave policy allowed
adoptive mothers and fathers to take a one week paid sick leave, yet
denied the same benefit to him. 10 6 The father argued that because
the university gave paid leave to adoptive fathers who had not un-
dergone the physical trauma of labor, he should be entitled to paid
leave as well. 10 7 The court applied a rational basis test to the uni-
versity's policy and concluded that the policy did not discriminate
against the father.'08 The court upheld the university's policy
based on the fact that "[a]doptive parents face demands on their
time and finances that may be significantly greater than those faced
by biological parents."' 0 9 While the distinctions between adoptive
fathers and biological fathers may be minimal, the court admitted
that "' [t] he process of classifying persons for benefits inevitably re-
quires that some persons with nearly equal claims will be placed on
different sides of the line . ..."'110
D. The Applicability of Title IX to the NCAA
In NCAA v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that Title IX's re-
quirements did not apply to the NCAA because the NCAA did not
qualify as a recipient under Title IX. 1" The Court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the NCAA qualified as a recipient under
Title IX because the NCAA received collegiate membership dues
from federally-funded colleges." 2 The Court, however, left open
105. See Johnson, 431 F.3d at 330 (finding that "labor is a distinguishing char-
acteristic" such that father could not claim they were similarly situated).
106. See id. at 328 n.2 (stating university parental leave policy with respect to
adoptive parents).
107. See id. at 328 (arguing that university's "[p]arental [leave [p]olicy con-
tains a 'biological father exclusion"' because university only provides benefits to
mothers and adoptive parents).
108. See id. at 331 (emphasizing strict scrutiny test is not applicable because
United States Supreme Court has not recognized paid childrearing leave as funda-
mental right).
109. Id. (offering example that adoptive parents do not receive same insur-
ance benefits as biological parents). Adoptive parents may also need time off to
handle the administrative matters of adoption. See id.
110. Johnson, 431 F.3d at 331 (noting further that where line should be drawn
is better left to legislature than courts).
111. See 525 U.S. 459, 468 (1999), vacating as moot 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998)
(defining "recipients" as "[e]ntities that receive federal [financial] assistance,
whether directly or through an intermediary").
112. See id. (finding that because federal funds paid to colleges were not spe-
cifically earmarked for purpose of paying NCAA dues, NCAA did not qualify as
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the possibility that Title IX applied to the NCAA based on several
other theories presented by the plaintiff.113 First, the plaintiff ar-
gued that Title IX applied to the NCAA because, as member institu-
tions of the NCAA, colleges and universities give the NCAA
"controlling authority" over their federally-funded programs. 114
Second, the plaintiff maintained that Title IX applied to the NCAA
because the NCAA receives federal financial assistance directly and
indirectly through the National Youth Sports Program ("NYSP"). 115
The NCAA created the NYSP to host youth educational programs
during the summer months. 116 The NYSP Fund finances the
NYSP's programs, and the NYSP Fund receives federal financial as-
sistance from the Department of Health and Human Services. 117
Therefore, the plaintiff argued that the NCAA, through its relation-
ship with the NYSP and NYSP Fund, qualified as a recipient under
Title IX. 118
receiving federal financial assistance through intermediary). "At most, the
[NCAA's] receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal
assistance afforded its members." Id. To hold that a private organization which
receives indirect economic benefits is a recipient of federal funding "would yield
almost 'limitless coverage."' Id. at 467 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 608 (1986)).
113. See id. at 469 n.7 (remanding case to U.S. Court of Appeals for Third
Circuit to determine whether Title IX applied to NCAA based on one of two alter-
native theories presented by plaintiff).
114. See id. at 469-70 (claiming that because NCAA has authority to control
member institutions' federally-funded programs, NCAA must comply with Title
IX).
115. See id. at 469 (stating second alternative argument made by plaintiff).
116. See Matthew P. Hamner, Note, Bump, Set, Spiked: Determining Whether the
National Collegiate Athletic Association is a Recipient of Federal Funds Under Title IX, 65
Mo. L. REV. 773, 775 n.16 (2000) (stating that National Youth Sports Program
("NYSP") conducts programs developed by NCAA). The programs, which are held
at college campuses across the U.S., educate economically disadvantaged children
in the areas of athletics, education, health, and nutrition. See Isaac Ruiz, NCAA v.
Smith: Must the NCAA Play by the Rules?, 26 J.C. & U.L. 119, 137 (1999) (noting
NCAA exercises "substantial control" over NYSP).
117. SeeCureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that prior
to 1992, Department of Health and Human Services gave NYSP's funding directly
to NCAA, without specifying that funds be used for NYSP). In 1989, the NCAA
established the NYSP Fund "as a nonprofit corporation to administer the NYSP."
Id. Subsequent to 1992, the Department of Health and Human Services has given
NYSP's funding to the NYSP Fund. See id. ("The [NYSP] Fund is regarded as an
NCAA 'affiliate."'). But see Hamner, supra note 116, at 775 n.16 (highlighting
NCAA's claim that NCAA is "distinct" entity from NYSP).
118. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469 (1999) (arguing that because
NCAA created NYSP and NYSP Fund, NCAA is both direct and indirect recipient
of federal funding and subject to requirements of Title IX). For a further discus-
sion of the relationship between the NCAA, NYSP, and NYSP Fund, see infra notes
14049 and accompanying text.
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In the remanded decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the NCAA did not have controlling author-
ity over its member institutions.1 19 Yet, the court stated that the
plaintiffs second argument involving the NYSP Fund would be suf-
119. See Smith v. NCAA, 266 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2001) (reasoning that
'-NCAA members have not ceded controlling authority to the NCAA by giving it
the power to enforce its eligibility rules directly against the students'" (citing Cure-
ton, 198 F.3d at 117-18)). The court had previously decided the issue of "whether
the NCAA has 'controlling authority' over its federally-funded members in the con-
text of Title VI." Id. at 155 (referring to Cureton decision). Because courts have
consistently held that Title IX is interpreted similarly to Title VI, the court's rea-
soning in Cureton binds the Smith court. See id. at 157-58. In Cureton, the court
made two findings. See 198 F.3d at 115-17. First, the court held that the NCAA did
not control its member institutions because member institutions have a choice as
to whether to enforce NCAA's suggested rules against its student-athletes. See id. at
117 (relying on NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988)); see also Smith, 266
F.3d at 156 (mentioning that member institution may choose not to enforce
NCAA's "recommendations and risk[ ] sanctions, or it could [choose to] volunta-
rily withdraw[ ] from the NCAA"). A member institution's claim that its options
are "'unpalatable does not mean that they [are] nonexistent."' Smith, 266 F.3d at
156 (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 n.19). Further, the NCAA's constitution
specifically states that member institutions retain control over their own athletic
programs. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 118. Second, the court ruled that the NCAA was
not a recipient of federal funding under Title VI. See id. at 114. The plaintiff
argued that the NCAA was a recipient of federal funding because the NCAA re-
ceived federal financial assistance from the Department of Health and Human
Services to run the NYSP. See id. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned
that the regulations permitted a program-specific approach, meaning that the
court considered only the NYSP, not the entire entity of the NCAA, a recipient of
federal funding. See id. at 113-15. A program-specific approach allows "recipients
of [flederal financial assistance [to] discriminat[e] with respect to a program not
receiving such assistance." Id. at 114. Further, the court differentiated the CRRA
from the present case. See id. at 115 (noting that CRRA overruled program-specific
application of Title IX adopted by Supreme Court in Grove and implemented insti-
tution-wide application). The court stated that the CRRA only mandated institu-
tion-wide coverage in cases of disparate treatment; because Cureton involved a
disparate impact claim, the CRRA did not apply and the regulations permitted a
program-specific application of Title IX. See 198 F.3d at 116 (describing plaintiff's
claim that NCAA's requirement of minimum score on Scholastic Aptitude Test
("SAT") unintentionally discriminated against African-Americans). Moreover, the
court noted that the Department of Education and the Department of Health and
Human Services had not amended their regulations so as to require an institution-
wide application of Title VI. See id. at 115-16. Therefore, the regulations did not
require the NCAA to "give an assurance of nondiscrimination with respect to pro-
grams [not] affect[ed] [by] the [flederally assisted program." Id. at 115. Subse-
quent to the court's holding in Cureton, the Department of Education amended its
regulations to match the institution-wide application required by the CRRA. See
Recent Case, Title VI: Third Circuit Upholds Viability of Standardized Test Scores as a
Component of Freshman Athletic Eligibility Requirements: Cureton v. NCAA, 114 HARv.
L. REv. 947, 950-51 (2001) (noting that Department of Education and Department
of Health and Human Services have both renounced court's decision in Cureton as
circumventing congressional intent). "'[Cureton's] holding conflicts with federal
agencies' long-standing interpretation of the Title VI regulations and, if allowed to
stand, will seriously impede the federal government's enforcement of those regula-
tions."' Id. at 950 n.38 (citations omitted).
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ficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. 120 The court remanded
the case to the district court for reconsideration of this issue, noting
that if the plaintiff could prove her allegations, then "the NCAA,
the NYSP, and the [NYSP] Fund [would be] virtually indistinct."121
Consequently, the court would then consider the NCAA an indirect
recipient of federal financial assistance, subject to the requirements
of Title IX.122
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S CASE
A. The NCAA Must Comply With the Requirements of Title IX
For Butler's Title IX claim to succeed against the NCAA, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas must hold that Title
IX's requirements apply to the NCAA. 123 Given the Supreme
Court's ruling in NCAA v. Smith, Butler can proffer several argu-
120. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 163 n.9 (holding that "[the plaintiff simply]
presents a viable theory for subjecting the NCAA to Title IX's requirements").
Therefore, the plaintiff may amend her complaint to include an allegation that the
NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance based on the fact that the NYSP
Fund receives federal financial assistance. See id. at 163.
121. Id. at 162 (stating that while court is "hesitant to impose Title IX obliga-
tions on an entity that is not a direct recipient of federal financial assistance, [it]
nonetheless note [s] that [Title IX obligations will be imposed on] 'those who truly
assume control of federally-funded programs ....'). Moreover, if the court does
find that the NCAA is an indirect recipient of federal financial assistance, then the
NCAA will be obligated to comply with Title IX not only with regard to the NYSP,
but with regard to all of its programs. See id. at 160 n.6 (citing CRRA which signifi-
cantly expanded definition of recipient under Title IX by eliminating program-
specific application of Title IX and requiring institution-wide application of Title
IX if one program at institution received federal financial assistance). For a fur-
ther discussion of the CRRA, see supra note 119.
122. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 162 n.8 (" [T] he Department of Health and Human
Services has issued two letter determinations that the NCAA is a recipient of fed-
eral [financial] assistance by virtue of the Department's grant to the NYSP Fund.").
Further, in Bowers v. NCAA, the court held on two separate occasions that "there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the NCAA was a recipient of
federal financial assistance." Id. at 162-63 (citing 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 494 (D. NJ.
1998) and 118 F. Supp. 2d 494, 529 (D. NJ. 2000)). The court lists several facts
weighing in favor of considering the NCAA an indirect recipient of federal finan-
cial assistance: (1) the NYSP was run exclusively by the NCAA prior to the establish-
ment of the NYSP Fund in 1989 and the NYSP has remained substantially the same
since 1989; (2) there is evidence to suggest that the NYSP Fund was established for
the sole purpose of removing the NCAA from the reach of Title IX; and (3) in
substance, the NYSP Fund appears "indistinct" from the NCAA based on the fact
that the NCAA administers the NYSP Fund for a dollar a year, the NYSP Fund has
no employees, and the NYSP Fund's address is that of the NCAA. See id. at 162.
The court held that to ignore these factors "'would be to elevate form over sub-
stance in a way that should not be countenanced."' Id. at 163 (quoting Bowers, 118
F. Supp. 2d at 529).
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ments to persuade the court that Title IX applies to the NCAA. 124
First, Butler can argue that because the NCAA has controlling au-
thority over its member institutions, the NCAA should be consid-
ered a recipient of federal financial assistance and, therefore,
subject to the requirements of Title IX.125 As member institutions
of the NCAA, colleges and universities allow the rules of the NCAA
to govern their athletic programs. 126 Moreover, colleges and uni-
versities often give the NCAA complete control of their athletic pro-
grams. 127 While the NCAA refers to its rules as suggestions,
member institutions know that if they fail to follow these sugges-
tions, they risk expulsion from the NCAA.1 28
The consequences of expulsion from the NCAA would be det-
rimental not only to the member institution's athletic department,
but to the institution as a whole.1 29 For many institutions, col-
124. For a further discussion of the arguments that Butler can pursue, see
infra notes 125-32 and notes 141-50.
125. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1999) (mirroring argument
made by plaintiff). The Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether
Title IX applied to the NCAA under one of two alternative theories argued by the
plaintiff. See id. In the remanded decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit stated that Title IX did not apply to the NCAA based on the plain-
tiffs theory that the NCAA has controlling authority over its member institutions.
See Smith v. NCAA, 266 F.3d 152, 157 (2001). For a further discussion of the
court's remanded decision, see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 154 (stating that when members join NCAA, they
.agree to abide by and enforce [NCAA] rules").
127. SeeJOHN V. LOMBARDI ET AL., THE CENTER, U. OF FLA., THE SPORTS IMPER-
ATIVE IN AMERICA'S RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 7-8 (Nov. 2003), available at http://the
center.ufl.edu/TheSportslmperative.pdf (describing rules of NCAA as "extensive
and detailed" and noting that NCAA rules "control most aspects of college
sports"). The NCAA governs athletic programs at member institutions in order to
prevent them from "compet[ing] so intensely [so as to] destroy the sports enter-
prise .... " Id. at 7. Therefore, member institutions "operate primarily in response
to the rules of the NCAA and their conferences and secondarily in response to
particular values or circumstances of their own institutions." Id.
128. SeeNCAAv. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988) (pointing out plaintiff s
argument that "the power of the NCAA is so great that [member institutions have]
no practical alternative to compliance with its demands").
129. See Corey M. Turner, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Academics
vs. Athletics, SPORT SUPPLEMENT: A SUPPLEMENT OF THE SPORTS J., 2003 (detailing
large financial payoffs member institutions receive as result of their NCAA mem-
bership). As a not-for-profit entity, the NCAA must distribute a substantial amount
of its revenue to its member institutions. See id. (noting that 2002-2003 proposed
budget of NCAA listed operating revenues in excess of $400,000,000). After sub-
tracting operating expenses, the NCAA distributes money to its member institu-
tions based on the member institution's division. See id. The NCAA divides its
member institutions into three divisions. See What's the Difference Between Divisions I,
II, and III, available at www.ncaa.org (follow "About the NCAA: membership"
hyperlink; then follow "The Differences Between Divisions I, II, and III" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007). Division I member institutions "sponsor at least seven
sports for men and seven for women (or six for men and eight for women) with
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legiate athletics generate a substantial amount of income. 130 Addi-
tionally, expulsion from the NCAA, the predominant governing
body of college athletics, would necessarily mean the end of elite
intercollegiate competition.1 31 A member institution's decision to
disobey the suggestions of the NCAA, thus, significantly alters its
image and hinders its financial resources.1 32
Conversely, the NCAA can argue that it does not have control-
ling authority over its member institutions, and, therefore, Title IX
does not apply to the NCAA.133 The NCAA does not control its
two teams for each gender." Id. Other qualifications for Division I member insti-
tutions vary for each sport and include the number of games played against Divi-
sion I opponents, the number of home games played, and even minimum
attendance requirements for Division I football programs. See id. Division II and
Division III member institutions must each "sponsor at least five sports for men
and five for women (or four for men and six for women) with two teams for each
gender" as well as meet other various qualifications. Id. For example, Division III
member institutions cannot give student-athletes athletic scholarships. See id. Be-
cause Division I member institutions "generate a great majority of the NCAA's rev-
enue," Division I member institutions received seventy percent of the NCAA's
operating revenue over operating expenses. See Turner, supra. Whereas, "Division
II and Division III schools combined [received] seven percent." Id. Further, con-
ferences that fare well in the annual NCAA Basketball Tournament receive addi-
tional monies. See id. For example, the Big East Conference received additional
monies totaling almost $40 million during the fiscal years 1995-1996 through 2001-
2002. See id. "Thus, conferences, and by extension their institutions, reap huge
financial rewards for athletic success ...." Id. (noting NCAA's reward of athletic
achievement over academic achievement); see also Lombardi, supra note 127, at 37-
38 (describing football's Bowl Championship Series ("BCS") and listing estimated
amount of money each institution received for participating in Bowl game). The
estimated 2003-2004 minimum payout per team ranged from $750,000 to $14 mil-
lion. See id.
130. For a further discussion of the financial benefit of NCAA membership,
see supra note 129. But see Lombardi, supra note 127, at 20 ("Almost all intercolle-
giate sports require a subsidy from the parent institution's discretionary funds.").
"A few programs earn enough money... to pay the full cost of their operations,
but most do not." Id. Although an institution's sports programs may not be able
to sustain themselves financially, they are nonetheless a vital part of the institution.
See id. at 12. For example, sports programs encourage alumni involvement; in
turn, alumni donate substantial amounts of money to the institution. See id. Also,
college athletics "capture public enthusiasm for the institutional name and image,
and attract large numbers of people to the campus." Id.
131. See Doug Bakker, NCAA Initial Eligibility Requirements: The Case Law Behind
the Changes, 3 DEPAULJ. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 160, 162 (2006) (noting that
despite common misconception that NCAA is only intercollegiate athletic associa-
tion, alternatives exist such as National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics and
United States Collegiate Athletic Association). But see Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198
n.19 (commenting that member institution's "desire to remain a powerhouse
among the Nation's college basketball teams is understandable, and nonmember-
ship in the NCAA obviously would thwart that goal.").
132. For a further discussion of the impact of expulsion from the NCAA on a
member institution, see supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
133. See Smith v. NCAA, 266 F.3d 152, 157 (2001) (reasoning that because
U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit previously rejected controlling authority
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member institutions because the institutions are free to choose
whether they wish "to enforce or ignore" the NCAA's rules.1 34
Moreover, member institutions can withdraw their membership
from the NCAA at any time. 135 The institution itself has the "ulti-
mate decision as to which [student-athletes] participate in varsity
intercollegiate athletics .... ,"136 Under NCAA rules, the NCAA has
no authority to make this decision; it can only suggest to the institu-
tion the decision that the NCAA deems appropriate.137 Finally, the
NCAA's constitution specifically states that member institutions will
theory in Cureton v. NCAA, "[plaintiff] is precluded from amending her complaint
to include her 'controlling authority' theory, as it is futile" (relying on Cureton, 198
F.3d 107, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1999)). For a further discussion of the court's reasoning
in Smith and Cureton, see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
134. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 157 ("'We emphasize that [member institutions]
have not ceded controlling authority to the NCAA by giving [the NCAA] the power
to enforce its eligibility rules directly against the [institution's] students." (quoting
Cureton, 198 F.3d at 157)). But see NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988)
(stating plaintiffs argument that, in reality, member institutions must comply with
rules of NCAA because NCAA is so powerful); see also Turner, supra note 129 (sug-
gesting that, as member institutions of the NCAA, institutions receive significant
amount of income from NCAA in exchange for "conduct[ing] their athletic pro-
grams in a manner consistent with NCAA regulations").
135. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 n.19 (recognizing that, as alternative to
expulsion, member institution can choose not to enforce NCAA rules and risk
additional sanctions or member institution can choose to voluntarily withdraw
from NCAA). Because a member institution's "options [are] unpalatable, does not
mean that they [are] nonexistent." Id. The member institution argued that "the
power of the NCAA is so great that the [member institution] had no practical
alternative to compliance with [the NCAA's] demands." Id. at 198. However, the
Court reasoned that even if a member institution must abide by the rules of the
NCAA, "it does not follow that [the NCAA] is therefore acting under the color of
state law." Id. at 198-99 (noting that plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess claim depended on Court's finding of state action).
136. Smith, 266 F.3d at 156 (emphasizing that who is allowed to attend mem-
ber institution and who is allowed to represent member institution on athletic field
is member institution's choice).
137. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 117-18 (holding that NCAA does not have power
to directly enforce its rules on member institutions' student-athletes). For exam-
ple, in Tarkanian, an NCAA investigation of the University of Nevada - Las Vegas
("UNLV") basketball program found thirty-eight violations of NCAA rules. See 488
U.S. at 185-87. The NCAA's Committee on Infractions proposed a set of sanctions
against UNLV, including a two-year prohibition from postseason games and televi-
sion appearances as well as the firing of their basketball coach. See id. at 186. "The
Committee also requested UNLV to show cause why additional penalties should
not be imposed against UNLV if it failed to discipline [their basketball coach] by
removing him completely from [their] athletic program during the probation pe-
riod." Id. UNLV unsuccessfully appealed the Committee's findings to the NCAA
Council. See id. UNLV's President then considered UNLV's options: rejecting the
NCAA Committee's proposed sanctions and risking further sanctions; implement-
ing the Committee's proposed sanctions; or voluntarily withdrawing from the
NCAA. See id. at 187. UNLV's President chose to implement the Committee's rec-
ommendations, "[r]ecogniz[ing] the University's delegation to the NCAA of the
power to act as ultimate arbiter of these matters .... " Id.
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retain control over their own athletic programs. 138 The NCAA has
neither actual nor apparent authority to control its member institu-
tions and, therefore, does not fall within Title IX's reach. 139
Second, Butler can argue that Title IX applies to the NCAA
because the NCAA, through its relationship with the NYSP Fund,
receives federal financial assistance. 140 The NYSP Fund receives
federal assistance from the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices.' 4 ' Because the NCAA created the NYSP, and because the
NCAA exercises substantial control over the NYSP Fund, the NCAA,
the NYSP, and the NYSP Fund are indistinguishable.' 42 Addition-
ally, the NCAA makes decisions which determine whether the NYSP
Fund will meet its obligations to receive federal funds.' 43 The
NCAA is more than a beneficiary of federal funds; the NCAA is a
recipient of federal funds and subject to the requirements of Title
IX.
144
138. See NCAA CONST. art. 6, § 6.01.1 ("The control and responsibility for the
conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised by the institution itself
... .").
139. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 157 (reasoning that, based on court's decision in
Cureton, NCAA does not have controlling authority over its member institutions).
For a further discussion of the court's reasoning in Smith and Cureton, see supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
140. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469 n.7 (1999) (remanding issue to
U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit to determine whether NCAA's relationship
with NYSP Fund subjects NCAA to Title IX); see also Smith, 266 F.3d at 163 n.9
(suggesting that NCAA may be obligated to comply with Title IX based on NYSP
Fund's receipt of federal financial assistance). Although the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Smith is not binding on the U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas, the Third Circuit's decision does allude to the
strength of Butler's argument. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (illustrating that U.S.
District Court for District of Kansas is part of Tenth Circuit). Butler may be suc-
cessful in maintaining that, as a result of its relationship with the NYSP Fund, the
NCAA qualifies as a recipient of federal financial assistance. See Smith, 266 F.3d at
163 n.9 (noting that plaintiff's argument is "a viable theory for subjecting the
NCAA to Title IX's requirements" and remanding issue to district court); see also
Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494, 528 (D. N.J. 2000) (noting factual issue that
NCAA may be recipient of federal funds based on NYSP Fund's receipt of federal
funds).
141. For a further discussion of NYSP Fund, see supra notes 115-22 and ac-
companying text.
142. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 162 (claiming that NCAA, NYSP, and NYSP Fund
are "virtually indistinct").
143. See id. at 161 (applying Supreme Court's test in Paralyzed Veterans, which
states that entity qualifies as recipient of federal funding if entity is in "'position to
accept or reject.., obligations"' of federal financial assistance (quoting U.S. Dep't
of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)).
144. See id. (supporting idea that NCAA itself receives federal funds because
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Moreover, "[a]ccording to a member of the NYSP's Board of
Directors, the [NYSP] Fund was established because the NCAA
wanted to ensure that it was not a recipient of federal [financial
assistance]."145 The NCAA's actions, therefore, indicate that it had
significant control over the NYSP.146 The NCAA continues to main-
tain this same level of control over the NYSP. 147 With the establish-
ment of the NYSP Fund, the NCAA merely added a layer of
bureaucracy, attempting to artificially differentiate the NYSP from
the NCAA. 148 The NCAA's actions should not deceive the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas; Title IX applies to the NCAA's
actions because the NCAA receives federal financial assistance. 149
In response, the NCAA can argue that it does not receive fed-
eral financial assistance because the NCAA and the NYSP Fund are
separate legal entities.150 The Department of Health and Human
Services confers federal monies to the NYSP Fund directly. 51
Then, the NYSP Fund's Board of Directors determines how to dis-
145. Id. at 162 (suggesting that NCAA established NYSP Fund to evade being
considered recipient of federal financial assistance).
146. See id. (arguing that NCAA would not have established NYSP Fund if
NCAA did not have level of control over NYSP sufficient to render NCAA recipient
of federal financial assistance).
147. See Smith, 266 F.3d at 162 (recognizing that "despite the creation of the
Fund, the NCAA's role in relation to the NYSP essentially remained the same").
For a further discussion of the relationship between the NCAA, NYSP, and NYSP
Fund, see notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
148. See Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 119 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting remand of case to determine if
NYSP Fund is "alter ego" of NCAA).
149. See Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494, 529 (D. N.J. 2000) (stressing
that court should not "elevate form over substance" and finding "genuine issue of
material fact" as to NCAA's actual control over NYSP Fund).
150. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 110 (claiming that NYSP Fund is regarded as
"'affiliate"' of NCAA); see also Cedric W. Dempsey, NCAA's Government Affairs Report
Summary, Dec. 3, 1999, http://www.ncaa.org/databases/reports/2/presidents
council/200001pc/200001_d2_pcagendas16.html ("The NCAA continues to de-
fend its relationship, as an indirect contributor to the NYSP Fund and is not a
recipient of the funds through its relationship with the NYSP." (quoting memoran-
dum from Cedric W. Dempsey, NCAA President)). But see NCAA, Notes to Consol-
idated Financial Statements, at 30 (Aug. 31, 2000 and 1999), available at http://
www. ncaa.org/library/membership/membership-report/2000/financial_state-
mentnotes.pdf (discussing NYSP Fund in financial statements of NCAA and
describing NYSP Fund as "an independent non-profit organization"). On August
11, 2000, "the NCAA Executive Committee approved the dissolution of its [NYSP]
Committee as part of restructuring and clarifying the relationship between the
NCAA and the NYSP Fund. The restructuring resulted in a non-for-profit [NYSP
Fund] Board that has representation from Federal agencies, participating institu-
tions and members from the private sector." Id. The NYSP Fund's Board of Direc-
tors monitors all of the monies received by the NYSP Fund. See id.
151. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 110 (emphasizing that federal financial assistance
for NYSP is no longer given directly to NCAA).
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tribute the funds. 152 As a result, the NCAA does not receive federal
financial assistance because the NCAA does not make decisions,
which determine whether the NYSP Fund will meet the require-
ments to receive federal monies. 153
B. The NCAA's "Pregnancy Exception" Violates Title IX Because
It Discriminates Against Male Student-Athletes
The bylaws of the NCAA discriminate against male student-ath-
letes because the bylaws provide a pregnancy exception to female
student-athletes only.154 A pregnancy exception exempts female
student-athletes from athletic eligibility requirements beyond their
period of physical disability related to pregnancy.1 55 The typical pe-
riod of physical disability related to pregnancy is approximately six
weeks; that is, most female student-athletes physically recover from
giving birth after six weeks.1 56 The NCAA bylaws, however, allow
for a pregnancy exception which gives female student-athletes an
additional year within which to utilize their four years of eligibil-
ity. 1 5 7 The bylaws provide no such exception for male student-ath-
letes who have fathered a baby and wish to take time off from
playing their sport.158
Moreover, the NCAA bylaws do not specify when, in relation to
her athletic season, a female student-athlete must become pregnant
152. SeeSmith v. NCAA, 266 F.3d 152, 162 (2001) (noting that NYSP Fund, as
not-for-profit corporation, has its own board of directors charged with "adminis-
ter[ing] the NYSP"). But see id. at 161 (stating plaintiffs argument that "all of the
members of the [NYSP] Fund's Board [are] either employees of the NCAA or
members of the NCAA's NYSP Committee").
153. See U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606
(1986) (defining recipients of federal funding as "those who are in a position to
accept or reject . . . obligations" of federal financial assistance).
154. For a further discussion of the differences between the treatment of
male and female student-athletes expecting a child, see infra note 158 and accom-
panying text.
155. See 2006-2007 NCAA DMSION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1.3
(allowing member institutions to grant additional year of eligibility to pregnant
female student-athletes).
156. For a further discussion of the typical length of time for maternity and
paternity leave, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
157. See 2006-2007 NCAA DMSION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1 (stat-
ing that student-athletes have four years of eligibility and five calendar years from
date of initial full-time college enrollment within which to utilize four years of
eligibility). Under article 14.2.1.3, however, a female student-athlete may obtain a
pregnancy exception allowing her to utilize her four years of eligibility within six
years instead of five years.
158. See NCAA Denies Appeal supra note 5 ("'The pregnancy exception is ex-
plicitly written for female students whose physical condition due to pregnancy pre-
vents their participation in intercollegiate athletics and therefore is not applicable
in [a male student-athlete's] case . . . ." (quoting NCAA's Erik Christianson)).
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or must give birth in order for her to be eligible for a pregnancy
exception. 159 The bylaws merely state that "[a] member institution
may approve a one-year extension of the five-year period of eligibil-
ity for a female student-athlete for reasons of pregnancy."160 As a
result, a female student-athlete who plays basketball may theoreti-
cally obtain another year of eligibility "for reasons of pregnancy"
even if she gives birth six weeks prior to the beginning of her bas-
ketball season.1 61 At the beginning of her basketball season, the
female student-athlete would no longer have a physical disability,
yet she would still receive an additional year of eligibility. 162 This
additional time off beyond her period of physical disability is
equivalent to childrearing leave.163 In contrast, under present
NCAA rules, a male student-athlete who fathered that same baby
and also played basketball would not be allowed the same time off
for childrearing leave. 164 Therefore, the NCAA's pregnancy excep-
tion violates Title IX because it allows for childrearing leave in the
form of an additional year of eligibility to female student-athletes
but not to male student-athletes. 165
In Schafer v. Board of Public Education of the School District of Pitts-
burgh, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
employers must offer to male employees the same amount of chil-
159. See id. (noting failure of NCAA bylaws to address timing of pregnancy in
relation to athletic season of female student-athlete).
160. See id. (recognizing that under NCAA bylaw, only member institution
may approve pregnancy exception for female student-athlete).
161. See id. (giving member institution authority to approve pregnancy excep-
tion for female student-athlete, but failing to establish details regarding when ex-
ception may be granted); see also Wood, supra note 30 (describing Butler's
argument that NCAA bylaws discriminate against him because bylaws do not man-
date that member institution only grant pregnancy exception to female student-
athlete for time period during her pregnancy).
162. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 436 (noting that six weeks is typical pe-
riod of physical disability related to pregnancy).
163. See id. at 438-39 (stating that time off provided to female employees after
period of physical disability is considered childrearing leave, which is leave pro-
vided for childcare and bonding with infant).
164. See NCAA Denies Appeal, supra note 5 (quoting NCAA employee as stating,
"pregnancy exception is explicitly written for female students ... and therefore is
not applicable in [Butler's] case").
165. See Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 903
F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 1990) (ruling that Title VII prohibits childrearing leave to
be offered to female employees but not to male employees). Further, because
courts use Title VII standards to interpret Title IX, Title IX also prohibits an entity
from offering childrearing leave to females but not to males. See Mabry v. State Bd.
of Cmty. Colls. and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 (10th Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing Title VII precedent to Title IX gender discrimination case in U.S. Court of
Appeals for Tenth Circuit).
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drearing leave offered to female employees. 166 Even though Schafer
involved a Title VII claim, Schafer still controls Butler's Title IX
claim because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that the standards established under Title VII apply to the interpre-
tation of Title IX. 167 Further, in Chipman v. Grant County School Dis-
trict, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
specifically held that Title VII precedent applies to a Title IX preg-
nancy discrimination claim. 168 Thus, an institution discriminates if
166. See 903 F.2d at 250 (stating that "under the law, childrearing by a mother
or childrearing by a father should be on the basis of full parity"). The court re-
quired the employer to offer male employees the same amount of leave offered to
female employees for which the employer did not require the female employees to
show a physical disability. See id. at 248 n.5 (citing typical disability period related
to pregnancy to be six weeks, not one year as offered by employer); see also Cal.
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) (stressing legality of
California statute because it only allows time off for physical disability of female
employees).
167. See Maby, 813 F.2d at 316 (applying Title VII precedent to Title IX gen-
der discrimination case in U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit). The Tenth
Circuit's holding in Maby binds the U.S. District Court for District of Kansas, the
court hearing Butler's case. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, http://
www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (showing that U.S. Dis-
trict Court for District of Kansas is part of Tenth Circuit); see also Lipsett v. Univ. of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988) (ruling that Title VII analysis is appropriate
to determine validity of claim under Title IX in U.S. Court of Appeals for First
Circuit); Preston v. Com. of Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that like "most courts[,]" U.S. Court of Appeals for Fourth
Circuit agrees, "Title VII principles should be applied to Title IX actions"); Brine v.
Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming that U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for Eighth Circuit will apply Title VII precedent to Title IX case). But see
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65 n.4 (1992) (refusing to
decide whether Title VII precedent should be used to interpret Title IX case be-
cause plaintiff did not raise issue); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911
F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (ruling
that U.S. Court of Appeals for Eleventh Circuit will not apply Title VII reasoning to
determine outcome of Title IX claim because to do so would not create "the kind
of orderly analysis so necessary in this confusing area of the law").
168. See30 F. Supp. 2d 975, 978 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (noting that because Title VII
and Title IX have similar purpose of preventing discrimination on basis of gender,
precedent under Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") can be applied
to Title IX case). "Use of a disparate impact theory for proving discrimination is
well-recognized in [Title VII] pregnancy cases." Id. Therefore, Butler may prove
that the NCAA's pregnancy exception discriminates against him by showing that
"'a particular ... practice has caused a significant adverse effect on a protected
group."' Id. at 979 (quoting U.S. v. City of Warren, Mich., 138 F.3d 1038, 1091-92
(6th Cir. 1998)). The burden then shifts to the NCAA "to show that the chal-
lenged practice is a reasonable necessity." Id. at 979. Alternatively, Butler can also
prove discrimination under Title IX using a disparate treatment theory. See id.
(highlighting district court's belief in "high probability of success on the more
common disparate treatment theory"). First, Butler must prove that "[he] is a
member of a protected class who has been treated differently because of [his] sex
... Id. The burden then shifts to the NCAA "to articulate legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons" for refusing to grant Butler a pregnancy exception. Id. at
20071 357
31
McCarthy: The Legal and Social Implications of the NCAA's Pregnancy Excepti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
358 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
it grants leave to pregnant female student-athletes beyond their pe-
riod of physical disability without offering similar leave to male stu-
dent-athletes.1 69 Because the pregnancy exception applies only to
female student-athletes, and because it allows them leave beyond
their period of physical disability, the NCAA bylaws discriminate
against male student-athletes on the basis of gender. 170
The NCAA could argue that, even if Title IX applies to the
NCAA, the NCAA bylaws do not violate Title IX because the bylaws
do not discriminate against male student-athletes on the basis of
gender. 171 The NCAA's pregnancy exception only applies to fe-
male student-athletes because only female student-athletes can be-
come pregnant; consequently, only female student-athletes can
suffer the physical disability of pregnancy. 72 The Supreme Court
has specifically stated that an entity does not discriminate if it de-
clines to grant leave to male employees but grants leave to female
employees for a physical disability related to pregnancy. 173
Alternatively, the NCAA can also argue that the U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas should not use Title VII standards
to interpret Title IX because the Supreme Court has never ruled on
the applicability of Title VII to Title IX.17 4 In Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, the Court expressly reserved the issue of
whether courts should use Title VII standards to interpret Title
980. Finally, the burden shifts back to Butler "to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the non-discriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination." Id.
169. See Schafer, 903 F.2d at 250 (holding that under Title VII, employer must
offer both female and male employees childrearing leave).
170. See 2006-2007 NCAA DMwsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1.3
(allowing pregnant female student-athletes additional year of eligibility).
171. SeeNCAAv. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1999) (remanding case to U.S.
Court of Appeals for Third Circuit for determination of whether NCAA is subject
to Title IX); see also Smith v. NCAA, 266 F.3d 152 at 157, 163 (2001) (finding that
NCAA is not subject to Title IX under "controlling authority" theory, but remand-
ing to district court for determination of whether NCAA is subject to Title IX as
result of its relationship with NYSP Fund); Cal. Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) (reasoning that statute which provides leave to female
employees but not to male employees does not constitute gender discrimination
under Title VII so long as statute is narrowly written to include only period of
actual physical disability related to pregnancy).
172. See NCAA Denies Appeal, supra note 5 (noting NCAA's statement that preg-
nancy exception only applies to female student-athletes because only female stu-
dent-athletes experience change in their "physical condition due to pregnancy").
173. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 276, 280, 290 (ruling that California statute, which
refused leave to male employees but allowed up to four months of unpaid leave to
female employees for purpose of recovering from "actual physical disability on ac-
count of pregnancy," did not violate Title VII).
174. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's silence as to whether
Title VII applies to Title IX claim, see supra note 76.
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IX.175 The Court did not address a previous ruling that Title VII
should not be applied to Title IX because, while both statutes pro-
hibit discrimination, the statutes do so differently: Title VII bans
discrimination outright, whereas Title IX bans discrimination
conditionally. 176
Moreover, granting pregnancy leave to a female student-ath-
lete differs from granting pregnancy leave to a female employee. 177
Theoretically, a female employee may continue in her present posi-
tion until she gives birth; however, a female student-athlete may not
because of the physical demands of her sport.' 78 Therefore, be-
cause a female student-athlete may not be able to participate in her
sport after becoming pregnant, the NCAA provides a pregnancy
exception.' 79
Hypothetically, suppose that a female student-athlete plays bas-
ketball and becomes pregnant three months prior to the start of
her season. Further, her doctor does not believe that she should
play basketball after the first three months of her pregnancy. 8 0 A
typical women's basketball season lasts approximately five and a
half months.' 81 Therefore, the female student-athlete will miss the
175. See 503 U.S. 60, 65 n.4 (1992) (reserving issue of Title VII's applicability
to Title IX for time when plaintiff presents argument before Supreme Court).
176. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir.
1990) (declining to extend Title VII analysis to Title IX). For a further discussion
of Title VII's applicability to Title IX, see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
177. See Women's Sports Foundation, http://www.womenssportsfoundation.
org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/disc/article.html?record= 1145 (last visited Mar. 30,
2007) (suggesting that pregnant female student-athlete should stop competing
when she and her healthcare provider no longer believe it is safe for her to
continue).
178. See id. (stating that point at which female student-athlete should stop
competing depends on many factors, most notably what sport she plays). "'It is
impossible to provide a set of definitive recommendations that apply to the safe
participation of all pregnant females .... There is simply too much variability with
respect to individual fitness levels, intensity and nature of the exercise and specifics
of each individual pregnancy."' Id. (citing American Chiropractic Board of Sports
Physicians as to when female student-athlete should stop competing during
pregnancy).
179. See NCAA Denies Appea supra note 5 ("[t]he pregnancy exception is ex-
plicitly written for female students whose physical condition due to pregnancy pre-
vents their participation in intercollegiate athletics .... (quoting NCAA
spokesman Erik Christianson)).
180. See Women's Sports Foundation, supra note 177 (noting that pregnant
female student-athlete should decide when to stop playing sports after consulting
with her healthcare provider).
181. See 2006-2007 NCAA DVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 17.5.1 (de-
fining length of playing season as "the period of time between the start of
preseason practice and the end of the regular playing season"). The Friday closest
to Oct. 15th of each year is the start of preseason practice for Division I basketball.
See id. at art. 17.5.2. Conversely, the Division I championship game marks the end
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entire basketball season. 182 The pregnancy exception allows the fe-
male student-athlete's member institution to grant her an addi-
tional year of eligibility, giving her a total of six years within which
to complete her four years of eligibility.' 83 Thus, the female stu-
dent-athlete receives no additional time off during her season for
childrearing leave, and the pregnancy exception does not discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender. a84
As the above example illustrates, the NCAA could argue that if
there is any discriminatory effect of the pregnancy exception, it is
negligible; the discriminatory effect varies depending on the birth
of the baby in relation to the athletic season of the student-ath-
lete.185 However, consider one final example: a couple has a baby,
and both parents play basketball at the same member institution. If
the female student-athlete has the baby with ten weeks remaining in
the basketball season, then any time off that she receives past the
initial six weeks after the baby's birth must also be offered to the
male student-athlete.18 6 If the female student-athlete chooses not
to play basketball for the last four weeks of the season, and if the
member institution grants her a pregnancy exception, then the
member institution also must offer the male student-athlete a preg-
of the regular playing season. See id. at art. 17.5.4. Therefore, the 2006-2007 wo-
men's Division I basketball season lasts from Friday, Oct. 13, 2006 through Mon-
day, April 2, 2007, which is roughly five and one half months. See CBS Sportsline.
com, http://www.sportsline.com/collegebasketball (on file with author) (listing
NCAA Tournament Championship as scheduled for April 2, 2007).
182. See Salynn Boyles, Typical Pregnancy Now 39 Weeks, Not 40, WebMD, Mar.
23, 2006, http://www.webmd.com/content/article/120/113711.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2007) (stating that thirty-nine weeks is most common length of preg-
nancy). Thus, if the female student-athlete is pregnant twelve weeks prior to the
start of the season and twenty-two weeks during the season, then her pregnancy
lasts the entire basketball season.
183. See 2006-2007 NCAA DrwsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1 (not-
ing typical student-athlete has five calendar years from date of initial full-time col-
lege enrollment within which to utilize four years of eligibility).
184. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 430 (defining childrearing leave as any
additional time female receives after giving birth and recovering from physical dis-
ability of childbirth).
185. For a further discussion of the discriminatory effect of the pregnancy
exception, see supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
186. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 436 (relying on medical textbooks for
determination that female is typically fully recovered from physical disability of
pregnancy within six weeks of giving birth); see also Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of
the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that it is
discriminatory under Title VII to grant time to female employees beyond their
period of physical disability without also offering similar time to male employees);
Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Coils. and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 (10th
Cir. 1987) (holding that, in U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, Title VII
standards will be used to interpret Title IX cases).
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nancy exception or its equivalent. 18 7 The NCAA bylaws discrimi-
nate against male student-athletes on the basis of gender; the bylaws
do not allow a member institution to grant male student-athletes a
pregnancy exception or its equivalent, and the bylaws do not limit
the circumstances under which a member institution may grant fe-
male student-athletes a pregnancy exception. 88
IV. CONCLUSION
At first glance it may seem appropriate for the NCAA's preg-
nancy exception to apply only to female student-athletes.18 9 How-
ever, because courts apply Title VII standards to Tide IX claims,
Butler makes a persuasive argument that the NCAA bylaws discrimi-
nate against male student-athletes. 190 Title VII prohibits employers
from granting female employees time off without a showing of ac-
tual physical disability related to childbirth.19' In addition, Title VII
forbids employers from granting female employees leave beyond
their physical disability related to pregnancy without offering male
employees similar leave.' 92 In marked contrast, the NCAA's preg-
nancy exception allows female student-athletes time off from their
sport without a showing of actual physical disability related to preg-
nancy.193 Moreover, NCAA rules do not provide a similar excep-
tion for male student-athletes who father a baby. 1 94 Therefore, the
187. For a further discussion of the discriminatory aspects of the pregnancy
exception, see supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
188. See Schafer, 903 F.2d at 250 (holding that for any leave for which em-
ployer does not require female employee to show physical disability, employer
must offer same leave to male employees).
189. See Schlussel, supra note 2 (quoting NCAA official: "[t]he pregnancy ex-
ception is explicitly written for female students whose physical condition due to
pregnancy prevents their participation in intercollegiate athletics, and therefore is
not applicable in this case").
190. See Mabry, 813 F.2d at 316 (stating that Title VII precedent should be
used to interpret Title IX cases in U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit).
191. See Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987)
(ruling that statute giving time off to female employees but not to male employees
does not constitute gender discrimination under Title VII because statute only pro-
vides leave for female employees while they are physically disabled).
192. See Schafer, 903 F.2d at 250 (requiring employer to offer male employees
any time that female employees receive beyond their period of physical disability
related to pregnancy).
193. See 2006-2007 NCAA DrVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at art. 14.2.1.3
(noting that NCAA bylaws do not specify conditions in which member institution
may approve pregnancy exception for female student-athlete).
194. See id. at art. 14.2.1.5 (noting that although NCAA bylaws do not offer
pregnancy exception or its equivalent for male student-athletes, NCAA bylaws do
offer "Additional Waivers" to be approved by two-thirds vote of majority of NCAA
committee present); see also Wood, supra note 30 (stating that, under present
2007]
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NCAA rules violate Title IX as interpreted under California Federal
Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Guerra and Schafer v. Board of Public Educa-
tion because the rules do not require a showing of physical disability
and do not offer similar time off for male student-athletes. 195 Be-
cause a pregnancy exception grants female student-athletes an en-
tire year of eligibility, female student-athletes necessarily receive
time off beyond their physical disability. 196 The NCAA must ac-
knowledge this fault in its rules and alter the rules accordingly to
become Title IX-compliant. 197 Regrettably, a change in NCAA
rules would come too late for Butler to have enjoyed his final sea-
son at KU. 198
Sarah McCarthy*
NCAA bylaws, no waiver equivalent to pregnancy exception exists for male student-
athletes).
195. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 290 (holding that statute is valid under Title VII
because statute only provides leave for female employees while they are physically
disabled); see also Schafer, 903 F.2d at 250 (requiring that if employer offers leave to
female employees beyond their period of physical disability related to pregnancy,
then employer must offer same leave to male employees).
196. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 436 (citing medical textbooks which state
that woman's reproductive organs physically recover from pregnancy within six
weeks after childbirth).
197. See Schafer, 903 F.2d at 250 (ruling that employer discriminated when it
gave time off to female employees beyond their physical disability but did not offer
equivalent time off to male employees).
198. See Suit Tests Ban, supra note 6 (stressing need for U.S. Court of Appeals
for Tenth Circuit to reverse lower court's ruling quickly in order for Butler to be
eligible to play in 2006 football season at KU).
* 2008J.D. candidate, Villanova University School of Law; Bachelors and Mas-
ters of Accountancy, University of Missouri - Columbia, 2002; C.P.A. license, 2004.
Thank you to my friends and family for their wonderful support and
understanding.
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